Our landings in the Channel - have over 
their forces to gain a 
satisfactory foothold and 
(Two hops.)

I think this 
withdrawn.

In particular 
Withdrawn.

given 

to 

occasion.

informed of the 

best 

information available.

The hope, the air and the 

flying did all that they could. 

Bravery and devotion to duty

could do. If any blame 

is mine alone.

July 5
WESTFRONT

Auf dem linken Rheinufer zwischen der SCHWEIZ und HOLLAND befinden sich zur Zeit deutsche Soldaten nur noch in alliierter Kriegsgefangenschaft.

Marschall MONTGOMERYs Brückenkopf bei WESEL ist 35 km breit und stellenweise 20 km tief. Neue Verbände strömen ununterbrochen über zahlreiche neu gebaute Brücken auf das rechte Rheinufer.

Im REMAGENER Brückenkopf haben General HODGES Truppen die deutsche Abwehrfront durchlöchert und sind 36 km weit bis LIMBURG an der LAHN vorgedrungen. Die Stadt selbst ist in alliierter Händen.

General PATTONS Vorstoß über den RHEIN bei OPPENHEIM führte vorgestern zum Fall von DARMSTADT. Die Panzerspitzen der 3. amerikanischen Armee sind bei ASCHAFFENBURG über den MAIN gegangen. Andere amerikanische Einheiten sind in FRANKFURT eingedrungen.

Bisher gerieten an jedem Tage des Monats März mehr als 10.000 deutsche Soldaten an der Westfront in allierte Kriegsgefangenschaft.

OSTFRONT

In Ostpreußen ist der deutsche Widerstand im Räume des FRISCHEN HAFS endgültig gebrochen. Die Russen haben bei den Säuberungsaktionen in dieser Gegend in den letzten zwei Tagen 21.000 Kriegsgefangene gemacht.

Südlich OPPELN haben Marschall SCHUKOWS Truppen LEOBOSCHUETZ und NEISSE erobert und sind, nach Ueberquerung von Oberschlesien, in die TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI eingedrungen.

Nördlich des PLATENSEES in UNGARN haben die Russen den wichtigen Verkehrsknotenpunkt PAPA erobert und stehen 65 km von der österreichischen Grenze.
SUBJECT: German Soldiers in American Uniforms.

TO: Commanding Officers, All 7th Corps Units, Oise Sector.

1. It has been confirmed that approximately 150 German soldiers in American uniform are now behind our lines. Forty of the Germans are dressed as American officers up to and including the grade of major; the remainder are dressed as enlisted men. They carry American Army paybooks and service records. They may wear either American or German identification discs. They carry German Soldbuches. They are armed with pistols. All the Germans speak excellent English.

2. The Germans are traveling in jeeps in groups of four. The jeeps probably will carry regular US identification marks, including the white star. The drivers probably WILL NOT have trip tickets. They may be carrying a German radio with them.

3. The personnel of this group consists of the following:
   a. Forty engineer specialists, who have the mission of destroying headquarters.
   b. Forty signal specialists, who have the mission of disrupting communications.
   c. The remainder are reconnaissance troops, who have the mission of proceeding as far as the Meuse River with a view to observing our maneuvers and supply activities.

4. The following steps should be taken to guard against these enemy agents,
   a. Entrance to vital installations such as headquarters, barracks, depots, bridges, tunnels, dumps, and signal centers will be rigidly controlled. The password should be insisted upon before permitting entrance.
   b. Guards for vital installations will be alerted to the existing danger and will be strengthened where necessary.
   c. All troops will be warned to be on the alert for such personnel.
   d. Where road blocks are manned, check will be made of vehicles and occupants by means of trip tickets, questioning as to general orders, and questioning as to facts of American life likely to be unknown to the Germans. Complete lack of knowledge of general orders by all occupants of a jeep will be grounds for suspicion.
   e. Suspicious persons will be placed under arrest and the AC of S, S-2, this headquarters, will be notified immediately.

By command of Brigadier General THRASHER:

DISTRIBUTION: "A", "B" & "C".

F. W. BROWN,
Lt. Colonel
Adjutant General.
SUBJECT: German Soldiers in American Uniforms.

RE: Commanding Officers, All Com 2 Units, Gise Section.

1. Reference ltr, Hq Gise Section, file AG 000.5 (G-2) dated 21 Dec 44, Subject: "German Soldiers in American Uniforms".

2. Further information obtained discloses that:
   a. The reconnaissance agents wearing American uniforms are radio operators whose mission is to reconnoiter the condition of bridges across the Meuse River from HUY to GIVET and the roads leading to the bridges.
   b. The German agents are riding in sedans and command-reconnaissance vehicles, as well as jeeps.
   c. Some of the enemy agents are carrying a glass ampule of sulphuric acid which will be thrown at guards in an effort to escape arrest. A thorough search of all clothing and articles of captured agents should be made. The glass ampule is small enough to hide in a match box.
   d. 40 of these Germans are uniformed as American officers, grades to and including major. In addition to German肃romuchs and German dog tags, they carry American caliber 45 pistols, American paybooks and service records. The groups were trained at GRAFENWEOH, had a German radio and probably are using American vehicles.

3. In questioning suspects the following are suggested:
   a. Question about the World Series.
   b. What is the capital of the home state they may claim?
   c. Examine dog tags.
   d. Any question about American way of life generally known to Americans and not common knowledge to the Germans.

By command of Brigadier General THRASHER:


DISTRIBUTION: "A", "B" & "C".
Local time is now 8 in the morning.

I have as yet no information concerning the actual landings nor of our progress through beach obstacles. Communiqué will not be issued until we have word that leading ground troops are actually ashore.

All preliminary reports are satisfactory. Airborne formations apparently landed in good order with losses out of approximately 1250 airplanes participating about 30. Preliminary bombings by air went off as scheduled. Navy reports sweeping some mines, but so far as is known channels are clear and operation proceeding as planned. In early morning hours reaction from shore batteries was sufficiently light that some of the naval spotting planes have returned awaiting call.

The weather yesterday which was original date selected was impossible all along the target coast. Today conditions are vastly improved both by sea and air and we have the prospect of at least reasonably favorable weather for the next several days.

Yesterday, I visited British troops about to embark and last night saw a great portion of a United States airborne division just prior to its takeoff. The enthusiasm, toughness and obvious fitness of every single man were high and the light of battle was in their eyes.

I will keep you informed.
PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS

Yesterday, December 7, 1941, a date which will live in infamy, the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

The United States was at the moment at peace with that nation and was continuing the conversations with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in Oahu, theJapanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent message, stating: While this reply contained a statement that diplomatic negotiations must be considered at an end, it contained no threat or hint of armed attack.

It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.
The attack yesterday on Honolulu and on the island of Oahu has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. Very many American lives have been lost. In addition American ships have been torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya.

Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications of these attacks on the safety of our nation.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense.

Long will we remember the character of the onslaught against us.

No matter how long it may take us to overcome this gratuitous invasion the American people will in their righteous might win through to absolute victory.
I speak the will of the Congress and of the people of this country when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will see to it that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again. Hostilities exist. There is no mincing the fact that our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger.

I, therefore, ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December seventh, a state of war exists between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

*******************************

[Signature]

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The text on the page is not legible due to the resolution and quality of the image.
(b) We have no ramps or launching slopes.
(c) Aerial bombs were under experiment, and not yet actually in use.

GROUND DEFENSE:


A. Anti-tank tactics: The main anti-tank tactics were close combat assault with various types of portable explosives (torpedo), while anti-tank armor, gunfire, tank traps and bazooka type launchers, etc., were expected to render secondary effect.

25. Q. Armor: How many armored units were available in KYUSHU for commitment to its defenses? In southern KYUSHU? How many tanks, and of what types, were available? In which areas would the tanks have been committed? In coordinated attack or in piecemeal fashion?

A. Armor:

(A) Tank units for the KYUSHU operations consisted of three brigades (41TH, 57TH, 61TH), one regiment (66TH INF), one independent company and four self-mobile gun battalions.

(B) There were 275 tanks in southern KYUSHU (standard number), and composed for the main part of average-sized tanks, while light tanks and self-mobile guns were included.

(c) The areas used by tanks in southern KYUSHU were scheduled mainly in the HYAKAKI and ARIMA BAY areas. Strategy lay in direct cooperation with the infantry.

26. Q. Chemicals: Was any type of chemical warfare projected? Why not? Was any type of chemical warfare expected from the Allies? What preventative measures were taken?

A. Chemical warfare:

(A) We did not anticipate active chemical warfare to any degree.

(B) The reason why we did not use chemical warfare was that world confidence would have been lost and the great disparity between the capacity of American and Japanese chemical industry put us in a situation in which we could not hope to contest.

(C) We did not expect Allied chemical warfare, but in the final stages of the war, that is in the case where Allied forces would have been defeated at their first landing in the KYUSHU area, we judged that the Allied forces might have resorted to chemical warfare tactics.

(D) The army was well equipped against gas attack by the Allies with masks, suits, antiseptics, etc. in quantities, while the civilian population as a whole was hardly provided for, with no means of counteracting any large-scale warfare.

27. Q. Artillery: What role would the use of artillery have played in the defense of KYUSHU? Would more emphasis have been placed on it than in previous operations? Would it have been used against Allied amphibious units at any points? Where?

A. Artillery:

(A) The principle object in defending KYUSHU was to defeat the Allied landing forces near the shorelines. Therefore, in order to accomplish this purpose, we put great stress on artillery. According to the military experience gained in fighting on islands of the Pacific, especially that of the PHILIPPINE and OKINAWA islands, the use of superior artillery was absolutely necessary in order to crush the establishment of beach heads.
THE JAPANESE PLANS FOR THE DEFENSE OF KYUSHU

By the end of July 1945, sufficient information was available for the G-2 to make a preliminary estimate of the enemy strength in KYUSHU. In the Sixth Army G-2 estimate for the OLYMPIC operation, dated 1 August 1945, it was estimated that 421,000 Japanese troops were on KYUSHU, comprising nine divisions (or division-equivalents), plus a large number of base and service troops, and naval personnel. Subsequent information, obtained prior to the end of the war, including new identifications and estimated reinforcements, raised the estimated total to 680,000, including fourteen divisions (or equivalents). This figure was reached just prior to the end of the war.

Information secured since the occupation of JAPAN reveals that the overall total strength on KYUSHU of Japanese units of all services and types as of the final day of hostilities totaled approximately 735,000, including fourteen divisions and seven independent mixed brigades. However, this total includes units on the islands off-lying KYUSHU, which were not included in the Sixth Army estimate of the situation. Strength on these islands totaled approximately 25,000 and included three independent mixed brigades. Thus, the Sixth Army, 1 August, estimate was based on information procured in May, June, and July, and full allowance was made for large scale reinforcement, while the projected (but never published) revised estimate with complete information was 95% accurate. The discrepancy in 1 August estimate was largely caused by the underestimation of naval ground troops, whose number was greatly swelled by recruits undergoing boot training and by crews from ships which had been immobilized by allied attacks, and from troop units in transit.

The Japanese expected our invasion of the home islands, they expected it to be made during or after October 1945, they expected it to be made in southern KYUSHU, and that our landings would be made on the beaches of HIYAZAKI, ARIIWA-WAN and SATSUMA PENINSULA. Their available combat forces had been deployed according to these expectations, with reserves being strengthened when hostilities ceased.

Allied convoys approaching KYUSHU would have received mass suicide attacks by every available plane in the KYUSHU area. Transports would have been the main targets of these attacks, and the Japanese expected to destroy 10% in this manner. Offshore, the landing forces would have been hit by large numbers of small suicide craft and submarines, and the Japanese expected to destroy 60 transports by these means.

Once a landing or landings were made, a decisive stand would have been initiated. Placing much stress on artillery, and having three tank brigades, one independent tank company, one independent regiment, and four self-propelled gun battalions to support division troops in their operations, the Japanese forces planned to make a final stand near the beaches and units were instructed to remain in place until annihilated. Heavy counter-offensives in the beach areas were planned and little preparation was made for defense in depth.

H. V. WHITE,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
AC of S, G-2.
I. INFORMATION AS PREPARED BY MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE JAPANESE SECOND GENERAL ARMY:

The following information on the defense of KYUSHU was obtained as the result of a directive sent to the Japanese Second Demobilization Headquarters (formerly the Japanese Second General Army). The Japanese Second Demobilization Headquarters was directed to submit accurate and complete information on the nature and extent of the Japanese preparations for the defense of KYUSHU at the time of the surrender, such information to be obtained exhaustively from all sources, including when necessary the memory of subordinate unit commanders and staff officers. Slight changes have been made in the grammar and wording of the Japanese answers in order to make a clearer text. No changes were made in content.

GENERAL:

1. Q. Were Allied landings on KYUSHU anticipated? If so, when, where and in what strength?

A. The landing of the Allied Forces on KYUSHU was anticipated. Allied strength was estimated at 300,000, and three areas in southern KYUSHU (namely the MIYAZAKI, ARIAKE BAY and SATSUMA PENINSULA areas, where landing would be enforced either simultaneously or in succession) were designated as points of landing, the time of which was predicted to be during Autumn (October) or later.

2. Q. What intelligence of Allied intents did the Japanese High Command possess? Specifically what was known and what was the source of this knowledge? Prisoners of war? Captured documents? Special operatives? Aerial reconnaissance and photography?

A. Various strategic information for judging Allied intents were controlled by the Imperial Headquarters, and from this information deductions were made and issued to armies under direct control. The Second General Army directed its efforts towards gaining intelligence of the military tactics involved in the minute details of the landing points, dates and strength of the Allied Forces based on the strategic deductions of the Imperial Headquarters. The methods for gaining this intelligence were: movement of controlled planes (reconnaissance and photography); observation of frequency and direction of U. S. bombing and reconnaissance within army area in the form of statistics; and study of movement of task forces and of the developments of international affairs, especially that of American public opinion (through radio reception). The main points of issue in the handling of information were: The problem whether the Allied Forces would conduct operations on the CHINA coast prior to their landing on the home islands, or whether SAISHU-TO and southern KOREA would be used as intermediary battle points when the home islands were attacked directly. However, mainly due to the progress of the PHILIPPINE and OKINAWA campaigns, the conclusion as mentioned before, that the southern part of KYUSHU would be the first landing area, was reached.

3. Q. Was it supposed that the Allied landings on KYUSHU were to constitute the main effort against the Japanese homeland or to be preliminary to larger efforts elsewhere?

A. The Allied landings on KYUSHU were reasoned as preliminary tactics to the main operations against the KANTO area.

4. Q. Was it supposed that the Allied landings on KYUSHU would precede, follow, or occur simultaneously with landings on the CHINA coast?

A. The landings on KYUSHU were judged as taking place prior to the operations on the CHINA coast. Judging from the landing dates and reserve strength of the Allied Forces, it was thought impossible for the CHINA and Japanese HOKO ISLAND operations to be conducted simultaneously, while the American strategic situation apparently lacked the need for conducting operations in CHINA, only resorting to
said tactics for political effects.

5. Q. At what time, if at all, was it anticipated that FORMOSA would be by-passed?
   A. Operations against TAIWAN (FORMOSA) were thought very improbable after the OKINAWA operations.

6. Q. Did the operations of Admiral Halsey's Task Force at all disturb the belief of the High Command that KYUSHU would be the first homeland island to be attacked?
   A. The operations of Admiral Halsey's Task Force did not in the least disturb the conviction that Southern KYUSHU would receive the first attack of the home islands group.

Japanese Troop Strength, Identity and Dispositions:

7. Q. What was the identity, history, strength and disposition of the KYUSHU garrisons prior to the arrival of reinforcements sent in because of the anticipated imminence of invasion?

A.

16 Army (area army) Controlled all army units in KYUSHU from FUKUOKA.

56 Army (corps) Controlled units in northern KYUSHU from IIZUKA.

145 Div (17,685 persons) Organized summer 1944; in charge of defense in area between KOKURA and FUKUOKA.

57 Army (corps) Directed units in southern KYUSHU from TAKARABE.

86 Div (20,614 persons) Organized summer 1944; in charge of defense of entire ARIAKE BAY area.

156 Div (17,429 persons) Organized summer 1944; in charge of defense of MIYAZAKI area.

98 IIB (5,638 persons) Organized from engineering units of UCHIYAMA FORTIFICATION, ARIAKE BAY, and given to defense of OSUMI PENINSULA.

TANEGASHIMA GARRISON Composed of three infantry battalions for defense of TANEGASHIMA ISLAND

(KURUME DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS

(KUMAMOTO DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Both organized about February, 1945, from remaining divisions at KURUME and KUMAMOTO. Units engaged mainly in instruction, training and recruitment.

IKI FORTIFICATION
TSUSHIMA FORTIFICATION
SHIMOKOSEKI FORTIFICATION
HOYO FORTIFICATION
NAGASAKI FORTIFICATION

107 IIB Defense of GOTO, NAGASAKI PREFECTURE; headquarters at FUKUR-DHO.
WESTERN TAKATOKI GROUP (21, 425 persons) In charge of air raid defense of entire KYUSHU area; headquarters at KOKUSA.

8. Q. What was the identity, history, strength and disposition of troop reinforcements brought into KYUSHU between 1 May 1943 and 12 August 1945?

A.

(A) Reinforcements under 56 Army (corps) (Northern KYUSHU)

57 Div (20,429 persons)
Unit transferred from MANCHURIA primarily for defense of FUKUOKA area, later interchanging with 351 Div after the latter's formation, and concentrating as reserves for area army strategy.

351 Div (12,215 persons)
Newly organized in June 1945, interchanging defense duty with 57 Div (mentioned above). Headquarters at FUKUIMA, FUKUOKA PREFECTURE.

312 Div (12227 persons)
Organized simultaneously with 351 Div, and undertook defense of KARATSU, MIYAK area. Headquarters at AICHI-CHO, SAGA PREFECTURE.

4 ITB (3,103 persons)
Newly organized, and under direct army control. Headquarters at FUKUIMA-CHO, FUKUOKA PREFECTURE.

6th ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS (119 persons)
Newly organized. Located at HARA-MACHI, MIYAK-GUN, FUKUOKA PREFECTURE.

(B) Reinforcements under 57 Army (corps). 57 Army formerly controlled the entire area of southern KYUSHU, but after the issuance of Allied invasion, the area east of OSUMI PENINSULA (inclusive) of southern KYUSHU was designated.

25 Div (25,804 persons)
Unit transferred from MANCHURIA, concentrated near KOBAYASHI, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE, and trained as reserves for defense of southern KYUSHU.

154 Div (17,341 persons)
Newly organized unit, garrisoned north of 156 Div on coast of MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE. Headquarters at TSUMA-CHO, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE.

212 Div (21,351 persons)
Newly organized as an attacking force, and concentrated in northern plains area of MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE. Part of the unit was stationed north of 125 Div on the MIYAZAKI coastline. Headquarters at TONO-CHO, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE.

109 IIB (6,888 persons)
Reorganized from TANEGUSHIMA GARRISON. Reinforced to total one artillery and six infantry battalions.

5 ITB (3,308 persons)
6 ITB (3,724 persons)
Newly organized to meet decisive battle in southern KYUSHU. 5 IIB was located at HONO-CHO, HIYAZAKI PREFECTURE. 6 IIB was located at KIRISHIMA, KAGOSHIMA PREFECTURE.

FIRST ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS (117 persons)

Newly organized, and located at TSUHACHI, HIYAZAKI PREFECTURE.

THIRD ENGINEERING HEADQUARTERS (167 persons)

Newly organized, and located at TAKI-RABE-CHO, HIYAZAKI PREFECTURE.

(C) Reinforcements under 40 Army (corps)

The 40th Army headquarters was newly transferred from FORAKASA and given command of the western half of southern KYUSHU. Headquarters located at IJIN-CHO, KAGOSHIMA PREFECTURE.

146 Div

Withdrawn from 57th Army, retaining former status, and entered jurisdiction of 40 A.

77 Div (15,640 persons)

Newly transferred from HOKKAIDO, and first placed in the area between KUSHIKINO and IZUMI. Later interchanged garrisons with 303 Div, after the latter's formation, and concentrated near KAWAKI and KAGOSHIMA PREFECTURE as strategic reserves. Headquarters formerly at SENDAI.

206 Div (21,354 persons)

Newly organized at decisive battle corps, and entrenched for the main part on the western coast of SATSUMA PENINSULA. Headquarters at IZAKU-MACHI.

303 Div (12,233 persons)

Newly organized, and interchanged garrisons with 77 Div. Headquarters at SENDAI city.

125 IMB (6,826 persons)

Newly organized, and encamped on coast at entrance to KAGOSHIMA BAY, SATSUMA PENINSULA. Headquarters at IKEDA.

FOURTH ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS (117 persons)

Newly organized.

(D) THE CHIKUGO GROUP

Invested strategic office to the former KURUME DIVISION, and was placed in charge of entire NAGASAKI PREFECTURE and parts of SAGA, FUKUOKA and OITA PREFECTURES.

118 IMB (7,104 persons)

Reorganized from former HOYO FORTIFICATION, forming a mixed brigade.

122 IMB (6,884 persons)

Reorganized from former NAGASAKI FORTIFICATION, forming a mixed brigade.

(E) THE MAKOTO GROUP

Invested strategic office to the former KUMAMOTO DIVISION, and was
placed in charge of entire KUMAMOTO PREFECTURE and part of OITA PREFECTURE.

216 Div (21,736 persons)
Newly organized as decisive battle force. During training in vicinity of KUMAMOTO, held as reserves by area army. Headquarters at UNO-GOKO.

126 LB (6,213 persons)
Newly organized. Ordered to guard ANAKUSA ISLAND.

11th ENGINEERING HEADQUARTERS (103 persons)
Newly organized, and situated at HAGASU-GO, KUMAMOTO PREFECTURE.

(P) 4 AA Div (21,415 persons)
Reorganized from former SEIBU ANTI-AIRCRAFT GROUP. Headquarters at TSUKUSHI, FUKUOKA PREFECTURE.

(g) THIRD COMMUNICATION HEADQUARTERS (2388 persons)
Newly organized under direct control of area army.

9. Q. What was the identity, history, strength and disposition of Japanese troops of all services on KYUSHU at the time of the surrender? In southern KYUSHU?

A. (See annex A, with attached map.)

10. Q. Had the reinforcement of KYUSHU troop strength been completed at the time of surrender, or was further reinforcement contemplated of southern KYUSHU troop strength?

A. At the time of surrender, scheduled plans for enlarging strength in the KYUSHU area were completed, especially in southern KYUSHU area, where it was quickly accomplished. After that, strengthening of reserves was being planned.

11. Q. Precisely what use would have been made of Home Defense Units and of Peoples' Volunteer Corps in the event of Allied landing? Would the Peoples' Volunteer Corps have been organized into Combat Corps?

A. (A) The Peoples' Volunteer Corps would have been appointed for traffic, communication, supply, transportation and other rear area duties, (at the time of Allied landing Home Defense Units did not exist.)

(B) When the Allied landing date became more imminent, the peoples' Volunteer Corps would have been organized into Combat Corps.

AIR DEFENSE:

12. Q. How many combat-type planes would have been committed to the attack on amphibious units of the Allied landing forces, how would these have been employed (that is, in kamikaze, high and low level bombing, dive-bombing, torpedo bombing, or belly-launching tactics), and what percent would have been held in reserve for use against later invasion forces?

A. The number of bombers which would have been employed to attack amphibious landing units was about 800, of which most were special attack types (kamikazes). Storming planes, bombers and fighters would have been ultimately transferred into crash-landing planes. They would have been used for dive-bombing (blasting) from midair (altitude 1,000 to 2,000 meters), while bombing altitude would be lower than 200 meters. Reserves against later invasion forces were almost all units in KOREA and the KIWATO area, about 70 percent against the above 800 planes.
placed in charge of entire KUMAMOTO PREFECTURE and part of OITA PRE-
FECTURE.

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Newly organized as decisive battle force. During training in vicinity of KUMAMOTO, held as reserves by area army. Headquarters at UDO-CHO.

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been used for dive-bombing (blasting) from midair (altitude 1,000 to
2,000 meters), while bombing altitude would be lower, than 200 meters.
Reserves against later invasion forces were almost all units in KOREA
and the KUMO area, about 75 percent against the above 800 planes.
13. Q. How much confidence did the High Command have in the ability of its air force to repel or thwart the Allied invasion? Was it expected that allied troops in large force would succeed in getting ashore?

A. (A) We expected that the Air Force could render a 10 percent damage against the invasion and repulse of the Allied invasion.

(B) We expected that allied troops in large numbers would succeed in getting ashore, so we planned a decisive battle on land near the seashore.

14. Q. What was the capacity of the airfields and airfield facilities serving the KYUSHU area on 1 August? How many assault waves were contemplated, at what intervals of time, for what length of time, and how many planes could be maintained aloft per wave? What percentage of loss was expected?

A. At what time would the main weight of the aerial attack have been brought to bear, when the allied amphibious forces were still well off-shore, or when these were concentrated in landing areas?

A. The main point of our air attack was to defeat the Allied forces on the sea; therefore we laid stress on the amphibious troops at sea and on anchored positions. On the 1st of August, about twenty airfields were available in the KYUSHU area; the capacity could serve almost all of the 800 planes indicated in answer no. 12.

The first assault wave, it was planned, would attack from all areas at the same time if possible; intervals of time, number of planes and length of time, etc., of later attacks were under the command of attack commanders (flight group commandants). We expected that we would have from thirty to forty percent damage, but that half of the bombers would succeed. Efforts were directed to that effect.

15. Q. How seriously had Allied bombing curtailed the capacity of the airfield facilities serving the KYUSHU area, and what steps were taken to offset the damage to these fields and facilities in a pre-invasion step-up of aerial bombardment?

A. The capacity of the airfields in the KYUSHU area was not seriously set back by Allied aerial attack. We made it a principle measure against the aerial attacks to separate planes from airfields, and widely disperse them, as well as to keep them under complete cover. We made an effort to strengthen the capacity of anti-aircraft of airfields, utilizing all types of guns, including those mounted on planes; but this plan could not be accomplished to the expected extent due to various limitations.

16. Q. In the aerial attack on the allied amphibious units, what types of craft would have had target priority?

A. The main point of our aerial attack against the allied amphibious forces was directed towards transport ships.

17. Q. What percent of combat-type planes would have been reserved for use in support of Japanese ground forces?

A. We did not in the least expect the direct cooperation of our fighter planes with the Japanese ground forces.

18. Q. Would any use have been made of parachute troops or of crash-landing raids in the event of Allied landings on KYUSHU?

A. We did not plan to use parachute troops at the time of Allied landing, but we made crash-landing attacks of all planes, the main tactics.

NAVAL DEFENSE:

19. Q. Which waters off KYUSHU were mined? How did to what extent?
Which waters off KYUSHU were earmarked for future mining?

A. The mined waters off KYUSHU are shown in the attached sheet, and these are all completed. (See Annex B). Future plans were to lay thousands of small mines along the coasts of KAGOSHIMA and HIYAZAKI against Allied amphibious forces.

20. Q. Were any Fleet units available for and intended for intervention in the Allied amphibious movement to KYUSHU? If so, what kind (carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines), how many, and how were they to be employed?

A. We had intended to interdict the Allied amphibious movement to KYUSHU, but no powerful Fleet units were available. The tactics of our fleet for this purpose were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>How to be employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Carrying suicide torpedoes to attack transports off the landing coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>(a) Patrolling the waters east and south of KYUSHU by low speed submarines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Attacking the convoys by high speed submarines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Attacking the reinforcement at sea by large submarines.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Q. Were any small PT-type craft, assault demolition boats, midget submarines, or l-cant "human" torpedoes to committed to the defense of KYUSHU? If so, where were the principal concentrations of these, how and with expectations of what kind of success were these to be used?

A. Small boats to be committed to the defense of KYUSHU were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>How to be employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PT-type craft</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault demolition boat</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Attacking transports by concentrating in the several coasts of HIYAZAKI and KAGOSHIMA Prefectures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midget submarine</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human torpedo</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small submarine</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Attacking transports by running out of SUGO STRAIT.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The expectation of success was to sink about 60 transports.

22. Q. Were amphibious brigades available and intended for counter-landings? How many? Where and when were the counter-landings to be made?

A. We had neither counter-landing intentions nor amphibious brigades.

23. Q. Had any ramps or catapults been set up for launching jet-propelled suicide planes or aerial bombs against Allied amphibious units?

A. (a) We had been selecting 10 places for the catapults of jet-propelled suicide planes in the northern district of KYUSHU and KAGOSHIMA PREFECTURES, but the construction had not yet begun.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

"DOWNFALL"

Strategic Plan

for

Operations in the Japanese Archipelago

28 May 1945

1. The attached Strategic Plan constitutes the basis for directives for operations to force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN by seizure of vital objectives in the Japanese Archipelago.

2. Pending the issue of directives based thereon, the Plan is circulated to senior Commanders and Staff Sections of United States Army Forces in the Pacific and to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, as a general guide covering the larger phases of allocation of means and of coordination in order to facilitate planning and implementation, both operational and logistic. It is not designed to restrict executing agencies in detailed development of their final plans of operations.

3. The Plan is being forwarded to the Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, for his information and guidance.

4. Directives and Staff Studies covering the several operations to be conducted will be issued by Headquarters concerned at appropriate times.

For the Commander-in-Chief:

R. K. SUTHERLAND
Lieutenant General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.
"DOWNFALL"

Strategic Plan

for

Operations in the Japanese Archipelago

1st Edition
23 May 1945
"DOWNFALL"
Strategic Plan
for
Operations in the Japanese Archipelago

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1. DIRECTIVE.

a. This Plan is formulated pursuant to directives contained in JCS 1259/4, 3 April 1945 and JCS radiogram WX 87938, 26 May 1945. It covers operations of United States Army and Naval Forces in the PACIFIC to force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN by invasion of the Japanese Archipelago.

b. The following over-all objective for the operations is assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"To force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN by:

(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardments and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of JAPAN."

c. The following basic command relationships are established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(1) Command of all United States Army resources in the PACIFIC (less the Twentieth Air Force, Alaskan Department and Southeast Pacific) is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific.

(2) Command of all United States Naval resources in the PACIFIC (less Southeast Pacific) is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

(3) The Twentieth Air Force, for the present, continues operations under the direct control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

(4) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific is charged with making plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN. He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in the plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN.

(5) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet is charged with making plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN. He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific on the plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN.

(6) The Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific and with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in the preparation of plans connected with the invasion of JAPAN.

(7) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of the operation
OLYMPIC, including control in case of exigencies of the actual amphibious assault through the appropriate naval commander. The land campaign and requirements therefor are primary in the OLYMPIC operation. Account of this will be taken in the preparation, coordination and execution of plans.

(8) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet is charged with the responsibility for the conduct of the naval and amphibious (subject to subparagraph c. (7) above) phase of the OLYMPIC operations and correlates his plans with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific.

(9) The Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force cooperates in the plans, preparations and execution of operation OLYMPIC and in the continuance of the campaign in JAPAN. At appropriate times, to be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Twentieth Air Force comes under the direction of the appropriate commander for the support of operations directed above.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.

a. Hostile. (See Annex 2 a, G-2 Estimate of the Hostile Situation in the Pacific Area (Under separate cover).)

(1) That the Japanese will continue the war to the utmost extent of their capabilities and will prepare to defend the main islands of JAPAN with every means available to them. That operations in this area will be opposed not only by the available organized military forces of the Empire, but also by a fanatically hostile population.

(2) That approximately three (3) hostile divisions will be disposed in Southern KYUSHU and an additional three (3) in Northern KYUSHU at initiation of the OLYMPIC operation.

(3) That total hostile forces committed against KYUSHU operations will not exceed eight (8) to ten (10) divisions and that this level will be speedily attained.

(4) That approximately twenty-one (21) hostile divisions, including depot divisions, will be on HONSHU at initiation of that operation and that fourteen (14) of these divisions may be employed in the KANTO PLAIN area.

(5) That the enemy may withdraw his land-based air forces to the Asiatic Mainland for protection from our neutralizing attacks. That under such circumstances he can possibly amass from 2,000 to 2,500 planes in that area by exercise of rigid economy, and that this force can operate against KYUSHU landings by staging through homeland fields.

(6) That the attrition caused by our continued land-based and carrier-based air preparation and support, and by our destruction of aircraft manufacturing and maintenance facilities, will reduce the hostile capability for air action against our landings to suicide attacks of uncertain proportions at an early phase of the operations.

(7) That hostile fleet elements will be forced to withdraw to the YELLOW SEA or Western SEA OF JAPAN. That the enemy will maintain the capability of a suicide attack against KYUSHU landings with the approximate strength of a typical carrier task group. That his remaining submarines and large numbers of small suicide craft will oppose our landings and that mines will be used in large numbers.

(8) That hostile sea communications across the JAPAN SEA, while relatively unimpaired prior to KYUSHU landings, will be progressively and rapidly restricted to complete interdiction by the time air is operating from HONSHU.

(9) That during continuation of Russian neutrality, the production capacity of hostile industries and raw material sources in MANCHURIA, North CHINA and KOREA will remain relatively unimpaired.
(10) That hostile logistic position will permit determined defense in areas of projected operations by hostile ground forces enumerated in (3) and (4) above.

b. Own Forces.

(1) That the entire resources available to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet will be available for the support of these operations.

(2) That there will be no effective redeployment of major ground combat units from EUROPE in time for commitment prior to early 1946.

(3) That entry of RUSSIA into the war against JAPAN at some stage of the operations may be expected.

(4) That United States Forces will be established on the line BONINS-Northern RYUKYUS at initiation of the operations.

(5) That at initiation of the operations, land-based air forces will have attained offensive air superiority over Southern KYUSHU. That strategic land and carrier-based air forces will have effectively crippled the hostile aircraft and electronics industries and reduced capacity of rail lines in Southern HONSHU, SHIKOKU and KYUSHU to an extent providing little capacity beyond tactical needs.

(6) That at initiation of the operations the United States Pacific Fleet will dominate waters east of the main islands of JAPAN, and the EAST CHINA SEA and as far north as Southern KYUSHU. That forward naval bases will be functioning in the PHILIPPINES, RYUKYUS and MARIANAS.

3. OPERATIONS.

a. Concept. (See Chart, Annex 3. a., General Concept of Operations).

This Plan of campaign visualizes attainment of the assigned objectives by two (2) successive operations, the first to advance our land-based air forces into Southern KYUSHU in order to support the second, a knock-out blow to the enemy's heart in the TOKYO area. The operations are continued and extended until such time as organized resistance in the Japanese Archipelago ceases.

Concept of the OLYMPIC operation visualizes entry into Southern KYUSHU by major joint overseas landing operations after intensive air preparation. Preparatory air operations include assaults by Carrier Task Groups and prolonged action by land-based elements operating in force from the RYUKYUS and MARIANAS. Initial assaults seize and develop the KAGOSHIMA WAN and ARIAKI WAN as parts of entry. The area is occupied as far north as the general line TSUNO-SENDAI to block mountain defiles and prevent hostile interference with our operations.

These operations are expected to require fourteen (14) to seventeen (17) divisions with appropriate supporting troops, drawn from forces available in the PACIFIC with minimum use of redeployed elements. Forty (40) land-based air groups and naval elements for blockade and direct support are established for support of the CORONET operation.

Concept of the CORONET operation visualizes a major joint assault supported by the massed air and naval power in the PACIFIC, to destroy hostile forces and seize the TOKYO-YOKOHAMA area.

Initial operations establish local air support and drive into the KANTO PLAIN from outlying beaches, while defenses of the approaches to the TOKYO WAN and Northern SAGAMI BAY are reduced by intensive naval and air action. Forces are built up by subsequent landings, and operations are continued to the occupation of the TOKYO-YOKOHAMA Area and the KANTO PLAIN.

These operations are expected to require initially twenty-five (25) divisions with appropriate supporting troops, drawn from PACIFIC resources remaining after OLYMPIC, augmented by redeployment. Land-based air elements and naval forces are established as required to support operations in central and northern JAPAN to conclusion, and to operate
against the Asiatic Mainland as necessary. Logistic facilities are established in the TOKYO WAN to support consolidation of central and northern JAPAN.

It is estimated that the maximum air garrison will not exceed fifty (50) groups, which figure is subject to revision as the situation develops.

Occupation of the KANTO PLAIN is followed by such operations from the OLYMPIC and CORONET areas as may be necessary to terminate organized resistance in the Japanese Archipelago.

If required by the situation prior to CORONET, intermediate operations are conducted to establish advance fighter elements in Southern SHIKOKU or Southeast HONSHU to cover our advance.

In event forces allocated OLYMPIC operation are insufficient to accomplish tasks assigned, build-up in OLYMPIC area from elements earmarked for CORONET is continued at the rate of three (3) divisions per month beginning about (X plus 30) with supporting troops as required by the situation. The CORONET operation is adjusted accordingly.

In event forces allocated CORONET operation are insufficient to successfully perform tasks assigned, build-up from the War Department Strategic Reserve is continued direct to the objective area at a rate of four (4) divisions and appropriate supporting troops per month beginning about (Y plus 90) to a strength required by the situation.

The United States Pacific Fleet conducts the amphibious phases of the operations, supports ground action after landing and covers the operation by naval and air action against hostile supporting air, naval and land forces.

The Twentieth Air Force, initially employed on strategic targets in coordination with long-range land-based and carrier-based air action, tactically supports as necessary the amphibious and ground phases of the respective assaults.

The Commanding General, CHINA Theater cooperates by conduct of diversionary and containing operations within the limits of his capabilities.

Should RUSSIA enter the war prior to completion of the CORONET assault phase, diversions from forces herein allocated may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to establish and maintain a sea route to Eastern SIBERIA. In this event, the operations outlined above are conducted with minimum alteration, such adjustments being made in timing as may be required to procure essential replacements for the forces committed.

b. Employment of Forces.

(1) Coordination.

Operations of United States Army Forces, the United States Pacific Fleet and the Twentieth Air Force are coordinated under the following provisions and principles:

(a) RYUKYUS.

1. CINCPAC provides facilities for, and assists with all available means at his disposal, the establishment in the RYUKYUS of such elements of the Far East Air Forces as are designated by CINCAFPAC in order to augment air action to the maximum prior to the OLYMPIC operation. The operations of these Army Air Forces are conducted under the control of CINCAFPAC. When the major portion of the Seventh Air Force has been deployed in the RYUKYUS, command of these forces passes to CINCAFPAC. In case Seventh Air Force units are required the, after by CINCPAC for support of local operations, arrangements are made with CINCAFPAC by dispatch.

2. CINCPAC continues to press the development of port and airdrome facilities, and to assist in establishing increased Army Air Forces in the RYUKYUS. CINCAFPAC furnishes within the limit of his capabilities, United States Army resources to assist in the deploy-
HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

23 March 1945

GENERAL ORDERS

NUMBER 70

TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE THIRD ARMY

AND

TO OUR COMRADES OF THE XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

In the period from January 29 to March 22, 1945, you have wrested 6,484 square miles of territory from the enemy. You have taken 3,072 cities, towns, and villages, including among the former: TRIER, KOBLENZ, BINGEN, WORMS, MAINZ, KAIERSLAUTERN, and LUDWIGSHAFEN.

You have captured 140,112 enemy soldiers, and have killed or wounded an additional 99,000, thereby eliminating practically all of the German 7th and 1st Armies. History records no greater achievement in so limited a time.

This great campaign was only made possible by your disciplined valor, unswerving devotion to duty, coupled with the unparalleled audacity and speed of your advance on the ground; while from the air, the peerless fighter-bombers kept up a relentless round-the-clock attack upon the disorganized enemy.

The world rings with your praises; better still, General Marshall, General Eisenhower, and General Bradley have all personally commended you. The highest honor I have ever attained is that of having my name coupled with yours in these great events.

Please accept my heartfelt admiration and thanks for what you have done, and remember that your assault crossing over the Rhine at 2200 hours last night assures you of even greater glory to come.

S. S. PATTON, JR.
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "C"
Twelfth Army Group
XIX TAC
PASSIERSCHEIN


Dwight D. Eisenhower
Oberbefehlshaber
der alliierten Expeditionstruppen

Englische Übersetzung nachstehend. Sie dient als Anweisung an die alliierten Vorposten.

SAFE CONDUCT

The German soldier who carries this safe conduct is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be disarmed, to be well looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required, and to be removed from the danger zone as soon as possible.

Dwight D. Eisenhower
Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
Grundsätze des Kriegsgefangenenrechts

(Laut Haager Konvention 1907, Genfer Konvention 1929)


2. Kriegsgefangene haben so bald wie möglich zu Sammelposten gebracht zu werden, die weit genug von der Gefahrenzone entfernt sind, um ihre persönliche Sicherheit zu gewährleisten.

3. Sie erhalten dieselbe Verpflegung in Qualität und Quantität wie Angehörige der alliierten Heere und werden, falls krank oder verwundet, in denselben Lazaretten behandelt wie alliierte Truppen.


5. In den Kriegsgefangenenlagern haben Schlafzüge, Raumverteilung der Unterkunft, Bettsstellen und sonstige Anlagen denen der alliierten Garnisonstruppen gleichwertig zu sein.


* Als Soldaten gelten auf Grund der Haager Konvention (IV, 1907): Alle bewaffneten Personen, die Uniform oder ein von Weitem erkennbares Abzeichen tragen.

REGELN FÜR DIE GEFANGENNAHMEN:

Um Missverständnisse bei der Gefangennahme auszuschließen, ist folgendes angezeigt: Waffen weglassen, Helm und Koppel herunter; Hände hochheben und ein Taschentuch oder dieses Flugblatt schwenken.